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Rethinking Attorney Liens: Why Washington
Attorneys are Forced into "Involuntary" Pro Bono
Zach Elsner*

I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly everyone in the business of providing services knows that
clients do not always pay their bills. As service providers, attorneys
should consider their options carefully, as each option is likely to have
different benefits and raise potential issues: the least favorable option
being involuntary pro bono. An attorney suing a client for fees may
avoid ethical issues because the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct ("RPCs") do not prohibit suing clients;1 but, the attorney
should be prepared for a bar complaint nonetheless. Even if the bar
complaint is dismissed, the process will likely be costly and stressful.2

* J.D. Candidate 2004, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. University of Colorado at
Boulder, 2000.
1. See 51 AM. BAR ASS'N & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROF'L CONDUCT 110-11 (2004) (indicating a strong disapproval for the practice of suing a
client because, as a conflict of interest, it may violate the American Bar Association's (ABA)
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003)); see also AM. BAR ASS'N CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS 14 (1969) (stating that "lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to
prevent injustice, imposition, or fraud"). Canon 14 was adopted on August 27, 1908. AM. BAR
ASS'N COMPENDIUM OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY: RULES AND STANDARDS 331 (2003).
However, the 1908 Canons were withdrawn in 1969 and are no longer official ABA policy. See
id. at 7. In 1969, the Canons of Professional Ethics were replaced by the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. Id. This Code was then replaced by the current ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct in 1983. Id. at 8. The canons were not rules that lawyers were required
to follow. Rather, they were simply guidelines reflecting the policy interests of the ABA. While
these policy interests are still relevant today, the canons were never officially adopted by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. When a bar complaint is filed against an attorney, that attorney will, at a minimum, have
to research the claim and prepare a response to the allegations. See WASH. RULES FOR
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In addition, the client may file a malpractice counterclaim that, even if
dismissed, may require disclosure of the matter to the lawyer's
insurance carrier, increasing the lawyer's premium.
Another problem attorneys face when suing a client is that it may
be difficult to collect a judgment unless the attorney can successfully
interplead3 or intervene4 another lawsuit involving the former client.
Collecting a judgment from a former client may be difficult, especially
when that client refused to pay the first time. In addition, filing suit
against a client may damage the attorney's reputation. Who wants to
be known as the attorney who sues their clients?
Instead of suing a client for fees, an attorney may assert a "lien
for attorney's fees."' While it is unlikely that asserting a lien will
avoid a malpractice suit or bar complaint, an attorney's lien is likely to
provide accelerated access to earned and owed fees.' However, several
issues are likely to arise when an attorney asserts a lien. For example,
there are different types of liens, one or more of which may or may not
be appropriate.' In Washington, attorney liens can be classified into
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER CONDUCT R. 10.5 (2004) (setting forth the procedural rules for
responding to bar complaints).
3. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 22 (2004). Washington Superior Court Rule 22 states:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required
to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to
double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the
claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a
common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another,
or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the
claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by
way of cross claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do
not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted under other rules and statutes.
Id.
4. WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 24 (2004). Washington Superior Court Rule 24 states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
Id.
5.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010 (2002).

6. Revised Code of Washington (RCW) sections 60.40.020 and 60.40.030 provide a
method for resolving a dispute over a retaining lien by moving for relief in the pending suit
without filing an additional lawsuit. Similarly, a charging lien may be enforced by the court that
enters the judgment. See MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER, 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.29 (2003)
[hereinafter 27 WASH. PRAC.].
7. RCW section 60.40.010 outlines four different types of liens. WASH. REV. CODE §
60.40.010. This Comment groups these liens into two subcategories: Retaining liens, WASH.
REV. CODE § 60.40.010(1); and charging liens, id. § 60.40.010(2)-(4).
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two categories: the retaining lien on the client's files and the charging
liens. The charging liens include liens on the client's money in the
attorney's hands, liens on money in the hands of an adverse party, and
liens on judgments. While this Comment argues that the lien on the
client's money in the attorney's hands should be recognized as a
retaining lien, the current Washington law classifies it as a charging
lien. Thus, this Comment refers to it as a charging lien.
In addition, the lien must be asserted properly. An improper
assertion of a lien will likely result in both discipline under the RPCs8
and failure to recover fees.9 Of course, the claim to fees must be valid.
If the client actually does not owe the attorney any fees, a lien for
those fees will not be enforceable. ° Unfortunately for attorneys, only
a few Washington cases have addressed attorney liens. Nonetheless,
the rulings have placed strong limitations on the use of attorney
liens. " Additionally, ethical rules
and opinions have drastically
2
limited the use of attorney liens.'
These ethical and judicial interpretations have transformed
Washington's attorney lien statute3 into a confused and illogical body
of law that frustrates the statute's purpose-protecting the rights of
both attorneys and clients. As a result, the statute is often misused or
avoided. Five reasons contribute to the statute's misuse or avoidance:
(1) the ethical rules make asserting an attorney lien too risky; (2) the
retaining lien has been limited to the point that it is useless; (3)
Washington courts have failed to clarify whether a lien on money in
the hands of the attorney is a retaining lien or a charging lien; (4)
courts have limited the charging lien on policy grounds when the
8. Attorney liens are only permitted as an exception under the Washington Code of
Professional Responsibility. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j)(1) (2004). They
are also treated as an exception to the rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(1) (2003). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that improperly asserted attorney liens will constitute ethical violations.
9. Gustafson v. Seattle, 87 Wash. App. 298, 304, 941 P.2d 701 (1997) ("An attorney's
breach of ethical duties may result in denial or disgorgement of fees.").
10. See, e.g., Ausler v. Ramsey, 73 Wash. App. 231, 868 P.2d 877 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 647 P.2d 1004 (1982) (limiting the
charging lien on real property); Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977) (limiting
the charging lien on child support funds).
12. See, e.g., Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987) (stating that "[a] lawyer
cannot exercise the right to assert a lien against files and papers when holding these documents
would materially interfere with the client's subsequent legal representation," and "[n]or can the
lien be asserted against monies held in trust by the lawyer for a specific purpose or subject to a
valid claim by a third party"); WASH, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.86)(1) (acquiring a lien
to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses); id. R. 1.15(d) (stating that the lawyer shall take
reasonable steps to protect the client's interests); id. R. 1.14(a)(2) (preventing a lawyer from
withdrawing from a disputed portion of a trust until the dispute is finally resolved).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010 (2002).
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attorney gains too much leverage; and (5) attorney liens are useless
when the client settles.
The Washington legislature should amend the attorney lien
statute because it is largely unworkable and vulnerable to misuse.
First, for a retaining lien on the client's files, the Washington
legislature should amend the statute to place the burden of proving
that the files are necessary on the client, and the statute should not
permit a lien when the files are needed for criminal defense or
defending a fundamental right. Second, the statute should classify the
lien on money in the attorney's hands as a retaining lien. Third, the
legislature should determine which types of property should be
excluded on policy grounds and amend the statute to specifically
exclude those types of property. Finally, the legislature should amend
the statute to provide for a lien on settlement proceeds.
After a brief discussion of the history of the attorney lien in Part
II, Part III discusses the basic rules governing the attorney lien in
Part IV of this Comment discusses the various
Washington.
limitations on attorney liens and how those limitations have
discouraged use or encouraged misuse of the statute. Part IV begins
with a discussion of general professional responsibility concerns and
continues with withdrawal and termination as they relate to attorney
liens. Part IV concludes the Comment with a discussion of the
inconsistencies of the retaining lien and a discussion of the various
limitations on the charging liens.

II. HISTORY OF ATTORNEY LIENS
In general, a lien is a claim, encumbrance, or charge on property
for payment of some debt, obligation, or duty.14 English courts have
recognized attorney liens since the 1700s."5 Because suits for fees were
generally not available, English courts recognized attorney liens so
that lawyers could be compensated for their services when clients
refused to pay.16

At American common law, courts recognized a general, or
retaining lien, while the special, or charging lien, was originally
recognized by statute. 17 The retaining lien was a passive lien,' 8 which
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933-36 (7th ed. 1999).
15. William J. Ohle, Oregon Attorneys' Liens: Their Function and Ethics, 27 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 891, 892 (1991). Ohle explains that English courts recognized attorney's retaining liens
as early as 1734. Id. at 892. While the charging lien developed in the early 1700s, "it developed
as an equitable right of the attorney to be paid out of the proceeds of a judgment." Id.
16. Ryan A. Bowman, Grayson v. Bank of Little Rock: The Battle Between an Attorney's
Lien and a Security Interest, 52 ARK. L. REV. 827, 832 (1999).
17. Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 510-11, 65 P. 753, 753 (1901).
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was not enforceable. 9 A lawyer could refuse to turn over any property
that came into his possession until the client paid his fees. 2' The
retaining lien was also possessory: when the attorney surrendered
possession of the property, the lien terminated. 2' The charging lien,
however, was a nonpossessory lien established as an equitable right. 223
It granted the attorney a priority on property recovered by the suit.
At American common law, the retaining lien was the only lien
available to attorneys, 24 but now 2many states, including Washington,
provide a statutory charging lien. 1
III. LIENS UNDER CURRENT WASHINGTON LAW

The Washington attorney lien statute provides for a retaining
lien and a charging lien. Section A discusses the retaining lien and its
general characteristics. Section B discusses the three types of charging
liens in Washington: on money in the attorney's hands, on money in
the hands of an adverse party, and on a judgment. Even though this
Comment argues that a lien on money in the attorney's hands should
18. Id.
19. Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 604, 647 P.2d 1004, 1011 (1982); Gottstein, 25
Wash. at 511-12, 65 P. at 754 (reasoning that the lien cannot be active because the statute does
not provide any enforcement process).
20. Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 511, 65 P. at 753-54.
21. Id. at 512, 65 P. at 754.
22. Ohle, supra note 15, at 895. Ohle explains that charging liens are equitable rights and
that they differ from ordinary liens because "possession is not essential." Id. at (citing Crawford
v. Crane, 204 Or. 60, 62, 282 P.2d 348, 349 (1955)). Further, Ohle distinguishes these liens
from retaining liens, in that the "amount to which the charging lien attaches is only for the costs
and fees of the particular litigation which brings about the judgment or recovery." Id.
23. Bowman, supra note 16, at 832.
24. Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 510, 65 P. at 753.
25. See Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 605, 647 P.2d at 1008. Only a few states specifically allow the
charging lien to attach to real property. Id. (citing ALA. CODE TIT., § 34-3-61 (1967); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-613 (1973) (current version GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-14 (2003)); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
481.13 (West 1971); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 87.445, .490 (1979) (current version 2003 OR. LAWS 576
(H.B. 2646))). Other states "provide for a charging lien on the client's cause of action or
judgment and any proceeds therefrom or property recovered." Id. (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §
25-301 (1962) (current version ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-304 (2003)); IDAHO CODE § 3-205
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1963) (current version 770 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/1 (2003)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 50 (West 1958); MONT. CODE ANN. S 37-61420 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 18.015 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.13 (1966); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:13-5 (WEST 1952); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-3-1 to -2 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2-102 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-41
(1977) (current version UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 (2001)); VA. CODE § 54-70 (1978) (current
version VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3932 (2001)); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 256-36 (West 1971) (current
version WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.36, 757.37 (West 2001))). In addition, five states recognize a
charging lien upon the judgment only. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. §34.35.430 (1981); IND. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-3-1 (Burns 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.18 (West 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. §
376.460 (Supp. 1980)); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40 (2002).
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be characterized as a retaining lien, it is referred to as a charging lien,
which accords with the current Washington law.
A. RetainingLien
The retaining lien allows an attorney to hold a client's files
hostage until the client pays the attorney fees incurred in pursuing the
client's case. Washington's retaining lien statute states that an
attorney has a lien for compensation "whether specially agreed upon
or implied . . .[u]pon the papers of his client, which have come into
his possession in the course of his professional employment."26 The
Revised Code of Washington (RCW) subsection 60.40.010(1)
("subsection 1"), the statute governing retaining liens on a client's
papers, has not been significantly amended since its codification in
1881.27 As at common law, the retaining lien is possessory: If the
attorney relinquishes possession of the client's property for any reason,
the lien is void.28 Moreover, the lien is a passive mechanism, which is
not enforceable by foreclosure or by sale.29 The retaining lien's
primary use is to compel a client to pay through embarrassment or
worry.3" Lastly, it is irrelevant whether the papers were retained in
connection with the fees in dispute.3'
B. ChargingLien
In contrast to the retaining lien, the charging lien is active and
can be enforced through adjudication.32 Washington codified the
charging lien as follows:
An attorney has a lien for his compensation, whether specially
agreed upon or implied, as hereinafter provided: .. . (2) upon
money in his hands belonging to his client; (3) upon money in
the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding, in
which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice
of the lien to that party; [and] (4) upon a judgment to the extent
of the value of any services performed by him in the action, or if
the services were rendered under a special agreement, for the
sum due under such agreement, from the time of filing notice of
such lien or claim with the clerk of the court in which such
26.
27.
28.
29.
12, 65 P.
30.
31.
32.

WASH. REv. CODE § 60.40.010(1) (2002).
Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 604,647 P.2d at 1007.
Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 512, 65 P. at 754.
Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 604, 647 P.2d at 1008. See generally Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 511at 754. As a result, the attorney cannot sell the files to a third party.
Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 511, 65 P. at 754.
Hudson v. Brown, 179 Wash. 32, 40, 35 P. 756, 760 (1934).
Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 604, 647 P.2d at 1008.
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judgment is entered, which notice must be filed with the papers
in the action in which such judgment was rendered, and an entry
made in the execution docket, showing name of claimant,
amount claimed and date of filing notice. 3
Under RCW subsection 60.40.010(2) ("subsection 2"), the
attorney can assert a lien on money held in trust.34 Similar to a
retaining lien, asserting a lien on money held in trust requires
possession and is waived or forfeited if the attorney does not retain
Additionally, like the subsection 1 lien, it can be
possession."
enforced pursuant to the summary procedure statutes,36 RCW
sections 60.40.02031 and 60.40.030.38 Summary procedure, which
gives courts discretion to resolve any dispute regarding the lien, is not
available for money or any property that has come into the attorney's
hands outside the course of professional employment.3 9 However, the
lien does not have to secure money that was obtained in relation to
that action, 40 and the lien is invalid when the funds are held for a
specific purpose, or if the funds are subject to a valid claim by a third
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(2)-(4) (2002).
34. Crane Co. v. Paul, 15 Wash. App. 212, 214, 548 P.2d 337, 339 (1976).
35. Id. at 215, 548 P.2d at 340.
36. Id. at 215-16, 548 P.2d at 340. RPC 1.14(a)(2) provides:
Funds belonging in part to the client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer
or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law
firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer of law firm to receive
it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 4(a)(2).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.020 (2002). RCW section 60.40.020 states:
When an attorney refuses to deliver over money or papers, to a person from or for
whom he had received them in the course of professional employment, whether in an
action or not, he may be required by an order of the court in which an action, if any,
was prosecuted, or if no action was prosecuted, then by order of any judge of a court
of record, to do so within a specified time, or show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
Id.
38. Id. § 60.40.030. RCW section 60.40.030 states:
If, however, the attorney claim a lien, upon the money or papers, under the provisions
of this chapter, the court or judge may: (1) Impose as a condition of making the order,
that the client give security in a form or amount to be directed, to satisfy the lien,
when determined in an action; (2) summarily to inquire into the facts on which the
claim of a lien is founded, and determine the same; or (3) to refer it, and upon the
report, determine the same as in other cases.
39. See id. § 60.40.020 (requiring that the retained property be received in the course of
employment). But see id. § 60.40.010(2) (suggesting that there is no requirement that the money
be obtained in the attorney's professional capacity).
40. See also 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.26. See generally Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 172,
268 P. 143, 144 (1928) (noting that funds secured were originally held in relation to another
case).
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party.4 Funds held in trust must remain in trust if there are any
disputes regarding rights to such funds between the lawyer and any
third party.42 Although current Washington law states that the
subsection 2 liens are charging liens, Washington Supreme Court
dicta and a Washington State Bar Association ethical opinion have
indicated otherwise.43 However, the dicta and the ethical opinion are
not binding on the courts. 4 ' Neither the legislature, nor the courts, has
resolved this issue.
Under RCW subsection 60.40.010(3) ("subsection 3"), an
attorney can assert a prejudgment lien on money in the hands of an
adverse party that is the subject matter of the action, 5 whereas RCW
subsection 60.40.010(4) ("subsection 4") provides a lien on the
judgment,46 which is not effective until a judgment is formally entered
in favor of the non-paying client.47 To assert a prejudgment lien
under subsection 3, the attorney must assert the lien before judgment,
but after the commencement of the suit. 4' Also, the general first-intime, first-in-right rule applies to both subsection 3 and 4 liens,49
meaning that whoever asserts the first valid lien has the first rights of
possession. Consequently, time is of the essence.
41. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987) (citing as examples In re
McMurray, 99 Wash. 2d 920, 665 P.2d 1352 (1983), and Dep't of Labor and Indus. v. Dillon,
28 Wash. App. 853, 626 P.2d 1004 (1981)).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(e) (2003). Model Rule 1.15(e)
states:
When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which
two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property
shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall
promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in

dispute.
Id.
43. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987) (citing Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d
598, 647 P.2d 1004 (1982), and Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 2d 508, 65 P. 753 (1901)).
44. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 65 (1986) ("Ethics opinions
continue to be rarely cited and relied upon in judicial decisions.... [The ABA] issued an
opinion in 1978 declaring that its opinions were not binding on lawyers." (citing Am. Bar Ass'n,
Informal Op. 1420 (1978))).
45. Jones v. Int'l Land Corp. Ltd, 51 Wash. App. 737, 742, 755 P.2d 184, 187 (1988).
46. Id. at 743, 755 P.2d at 188.
47. Humptulips Driving Co. v. Cross, 65 Wash. 636, 636-38, 118 P. 827, 827-28 (1911)
(explaining that an assignment of judgment is not subject to attorney's lien; judgment must be
filed to be subject to such lien); Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 243, 106 P. 742,
744 (1910) (asserting "until [judgment] was actually filed, it did not become a part of the records
in the case, and consequently was not a judgment"); Suleiman v. Cantino, 33 Wash. App. 602,
606-07, 656 P.2d 1122, 1124 (1983) (stating that a judgment against the attorney's non-paying
client is not subject to that attorney's lien); see also Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162, 170,
724 P.2d 1069, 1074 (1986).
48. Plummer v. Great Northern Railroad, Co., 60 Wash. 214, 217, 110 P. 989, 990-91
(1910) (stating that "there must be an action or proceeding pending against the adverse party").
49. E.g., Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 743-45, 755 P.2d at 188-89.
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Both subsection 3 and 4 liens require notice before they are
effective.5" For a lien on money in the hands of an adverse party, the
notice must be served on the adverse party"1 and the lien becomes
effective upon delivery of notice.5 2 On the other hand, liens on
judgments have a different notice requirement. These liens must be
filed with the clerk of the court in which the judgment will be
entered,5 3 but are not effective until that time. 4 For example, in Jones
v. International Land Corp., Jones owed attorney fees to Hunsinger
from a previous representation. 5 On May 5th, Hunsinger asserted a
lien under subsection 356 on money in the hands of International Land
Corporation and asserted a lien under subsection 4 on the judgment of
that suit.57 The court ruled that the subsection 3 lien became effective
when Hunsinger served notice on International Land Corporation on
May 6th, but the subsection 4 lien did not become effective until May
12th, when the judgment was entered.5" Because the first-in-time rule
applies, the lien must have priority before it is effective;59 if there are
competing liens, the first to become effective or perfect takes priority.
Both subsections 3 and 4 liens require a judgment in favor of the nonpaying client.6"
Since relatively few Washington cases have decided issues
regarding attorney liens, there are still many unanswered questions
that create confusion when considered in light of the limitations
imposed by ethical rules, ethical opinions, and judicial decisions. This
confusion makes attorney liens difficult to use effectively. Primarily,
attorneys either avoid their use, depriving themselves of their benefits,
or misuse them, depriving their clients of their protections.

50. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 60.40.010(3)-(4) (2002; see 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.27 (remarking
that although written notice is only required under subsection 4, it is highly recommended that
notice under subsection 3 be in writing because the date of notice marks when the lien is
effective); McRea v. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194, 197, 94 P. 924, 925-26 (1908) (stating that a lien
on a judgment must be in writing, since it must be filed with the court).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(3) (2002).
52. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 745, 755 P.2d at 189.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(4) (2002).
54. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 745, 755 P.2d at 189.
55. Id. at 738, 755 P.2d at 185.
56. Id., 755 P.2d at 185; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(3) (2002).
57. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 738, 755 P.2d at 185; see also WASH. REV. CODE §
60.40.010(4) (2002).
58. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 745, 755 P.2d at 189.
59. See id. at 743, 755 P.2d at 188.
60. Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162, 170, 724 P.2d 1069, 1074 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE § 60.40.010(4).
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON ATTORNEY LIENS
This part explores various limitations on Washington's attorney
lien statute within the framework discussed in Part III. Section A
discusses how ethical rules place a great risk on an attorney who
chooses to assert an attorney lien, particularly because an improper
lien is an ethical violation,6 1 and the rules are vague and general.
Another limitation, discussed in section B, is that if an attorney wants
to withdraw from a case, the lien is only valid if the withdrawal is for
good cause.62 However, good cause is irrelevant if an attorney is
terminated by her client, as discussed in section C.63 Section D
explains how the retaining lien has been effectively limited to the
extent that the attorney is deprived of leverage, which is the only way
the lien can be effective.64 Section E concludes Part IV, discussing the
limitations on charging liens. Specifically, the limitations on the
charging lien on money in the attorney's hands make the lien practical
only as a retaining lien.6" Additionally, the charging lien has been
limited in other ways: (1) the lien does not apply to child support
payments or real property;66 and (2) the lien is not enforceable against
a settlement.67
A. General ProfessionalResponsibility Concerns
If an attorney is found to have violated the ethical rules, a court
may find that any claim to fees from the matter is invalid.6" Asserting
an attorney lien is the exception to the rule prohibiting an attorney

61. See Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 610, 647 P.2d 1004, 1011 (1982); Gustafson v.
Seattle, 87 Wash. App. 298, 304, 941 P.2d 701, 704 (1997).
62.

See generally Ausler v. Ramsey, 73 Wash. App. 231, 236-37, 868 P.2d 877, 880 (1994)

(reaffirming the rule from Farwell v. Coleman, 35 Wash. 308, 77 P. 379 (1904) and citing
George L. Blum, Annotation, Circumstances Under Which Attorney Retains Right to Compensation
Notwithstanding Voluntary Withdrawal From Case, 88 A.L.R.3d 246, 255-56 (1993) (replaced by

53 A.L.R.Sth 287 (1997)).
63. Kimball v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Douglas County, 64 Wash. 2d 252, 257, 391
P.2d 205, 208-09 (1964).
64. See generally Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987) (limiting attorney liens on
client files or papers when a lien would interfere with legal representation).
65. See generally WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 4(a)(2) (2004). Since disputed
funds must be held in trust until the dispute is resolved, the lien cannot be enforced as a charging
lien, but rather serves as a retaining lien. See id.
66. See, e.g., Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d 100, 107, 558 P.2d 801, 805 (1977); Ross v.
Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 599-600, 647 P.2d 1004, 1005 (1982).
67. See Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 244, 106 P. 742, 744 (1910).
68. Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 610, 647 P.2d at 1011; Gustafson v. Seattle, 87 Wash. App. 298,
304, 941 P.2d 701, 704 (1997).
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from attaining a proprietary interest in the cause of action.69 Thus, an
improperly asserted attorney lien constitutes an ethical violation.
There are several rules affecting a lawyer's use of the attorney
lien statute. When attorneys withdraw or are terminated from
representation of a certain client, they must take reasonable steps to
protect their client's interests.70 One way attorneys can protect their
clients' interests is by surrendering property when the client is entitled
to it by law.71 Another way attorneys can protect their clients'
interests is by charging reasonable fees.7 2 Additionally, as a policy
concern, attorneys have been warned to avoid controversies over
compensation and to resort to a lawsuit only to prevent injustice,
imposition, and fraud.73 Although the American Bar Association
(ABA) provided guidance in the RPCs, it did not define the limits of
those rules as they apply to asserting attorney liens.74 The ABA
indicated that courts will decide whether the assertion of the attorney
lien was ethical, rather than the disciplinary committee.7 5 As a result,

the boundaries of the ethical rules as they apply to attorney liens are
undefined.
Attorney liens are dangerous for two primary reasons: first, there
is great uncertainty in the boundaries of the ethical rules; and second,

69. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8()(1) (2004). RPC 1.8(j)(1) states:
A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter ... (6)shall not acquire a proprietary
interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting
for a client, except that the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the
lawyer's fee or expense.
Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(1)(2003).
70. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d). RPC 1.15(d) states:
A lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment
of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and
refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may
retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (d).
71. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.16(d).
72. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) ("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.");
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (stating that a "lawyer shall not make an
agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses").
73. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS 14 (1969); see also discussion supra note 1.
74. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1520 (1986) (citing
Informal Opinion 1461, which states: "When a client fails to pay a lawyer's fees, the lawyer, in
determining his course of action, should exercise sound discretion in light of the Model Code
provisions discussed above. These provisions do not set forth specific rules applicable to every
situation but only general guidance.").
75. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1520 (1986)
(explaining that whether the attorney's lien is proper is an issue determined by law, not by
ethics).
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an attorney asserting an improper lien is violating an ethical rule.76
Therefore, attorneys who assert these liens must be careful to assert a
valid attorney lien without violating the RPCs. Because these rules are
vague and inconsistent with the statute, and because the ABA has
refused to set specific standards, 77 the only clear message to attorneys
is that they should only resort to attorney liens when they are
necessary and absolutely proper. As a result, attorneys have heeded
this advice and rarely assert liens; the legal community is generally
content to abandon pursuit of such fees for fear of harsh
consequences. 78 These limitations confuse the statute and have gone
too far, such that the risks outweigh the potential benefits.
B. Withdrawal Without Good Cause as Fee Waiver
When an attorney withdraws from representation, the validity of
an attorney's lien depends largely on the circumstances that ended the
relationship.79 Whether an attorney may withdraw from a case is a
different question from whether the attorney is entitled to fees.8" The
attorney who withdraws with good cause is entitled to fees, but the
81
attorney who withdraws without good cause is not entitled to fees.
Accordingly, an attorney contemplating withdrawal must consider
whether it would be with or without cause to determine if the client is
required to pay fees because an attorney's lien will always be invalid
when the client is not required to pay fees.
In Ausler v. Ramsey, for example, the court held that the attorney
waived his right to the lien because he withdrew without good cause.82
In that case, attorney Blumenthal was retained as plaintiff Ausler's
attorney under a contingent fee arrangement in a personal injury suit

76. See Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 609-10, 647 P.2d 1004 (1982).
77. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1520 (1986).
78. See Barrie Althoff, Ethical Considerationas to Liens, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Apr.
2000, at 47 (suggesting that attorneys are better off to classify such hours as involuntary pro bono
work).
79. See Ausler v. Ramsey, 73 Wash. App. 231, 236, 868 P.2d 877, 880 (1994) (stating that
if withdrawal is for good cause or justified, then the attorney may recover based on quantum
meruit).

80. Compare Kingdom v. Jackson, 78 Wash. App. 154, 159-61, 896 P.2d 101, 104-05
(1995) (stating that a motion to withdraw should generally be granted provided that the client
has sufficient notice and ability to continue claim and when withdrawal would not interfere with
the efficient and proper functioning of the court), with Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 235-36, 868
P.2d at 879-80 (stating that an attorney who withdraws is only entitled to fees if the withdrawal
was for "good cause").
81. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236-37, 868 P.2d at 880.
82. Id. at 239, 868 P.2d at 882.
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resulting from an automobile accident.83 Blumenthal asked Ausler by
letter whether she was interested in resolving the case in arbitration. 4
Ausler did not respond. 5 Blumenthal discussed arbitration with
Ausler three months later, and a dispute arose regarding the value of
the suit and the best course of action for Ausler."6 Blumenthal then
withdrew, claiming that Ausler did not heed his best legal advice, was
not acting in her own best interests, and did not respond to his letter,
inquiring whether she was interested in arbitration. 7 Shortly after
withdrawing from the case, Blumenthal asserted an attorney's lien on
any judgment received by Ausler pursuant to RCW section 60.40.010
on the basis of quantum meruit8 s Ausler then sought new counsel
and continued to seek damages.8 9 The trial court rendered judgment
for Ausler and ordered the full lien amount to be paid directly to
Blumenthal.9" Ausler appealed this ruling on the grounds that
Blumenthal's withdrawal was without good cause.9
The court in Ausler adopted the general rule that when an
attorney withdraws from a case, the attorney may only recover on
quantum meruit when the withdrawal was for good cause.92 However,
an attorney's lien is invalid when the attorney withdraws without good
cause.93 Consequently, to assert a valid lien and stay within the
bounds of the RPCs, an 94attorney must establish good cause for
terminating representation.
The court in Ausler found that Blumenthal did not have good
cause to withdraw because there was only evidence of one time where
83. Id. at 233, 868 P.2d at 878. In Ausler, the agreement was a standard contingent fee
agreement providing for one third of the recovery as attorney fees and no fee was to be charged
unless the plaintiff recovered damages. Id.
84. Id., 868 P.2d at 879.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 234, 868 P.2d at 879.
88. See id. at 234, 868 P.2d at 879; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1255 (7th ed. 1999).
"Quantum meruit" literally means "as much as he deserves." Id. It is based on the theory of
contract implied by law, and that no one who benefits from the labor and materials of another
shall be unjustly enriched. Id. The law implies a promise to pay for that which is deserved. Id.
See also Thomas D. Sawaya, Attorney's Right to Compensation when Prematurely Discharged
Without Cause, FLA. BAR J., Feb. 1989, at 24 (1989) (explaining that courts apply quantum
meruit to provide greater freedom to the client is selecting and substituting counsel and
protecting the attorney's right to compensation for services provided).
89. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 234, 868 P.2d at 879.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 236-37, 868 P.2d at 880.
93. See id. at 236, 868 P.2d at 880.
94. See id. at 238-39, 868 P.2d at 881-82 (placing the burden on attorney to prove good
cause); cf. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.86)(1) (2004); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(1) (2003).
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the client did not respond to correspondence and because an attorney
is generally bound to abide by the client's decision to accept or reject a
settlement offer.95 The court further noted that there is not necessarily
good cause to withdraw when the client has retained other counsel, the
attorney does not believe that the fee agreement is fair, the attorney
feels that the case does not have any potential, or when the client
refuses a settlement offer.96
While few Washington cases have decided the issue of whether
an attorney had good cause for terminating representation, courts from
other jurisdictions that have examined the issue have found that an
attorney's withdrawal from a case was for good cause in the following
situations: (1) when the attorney knows the client's claim is
fraudulent;9 7 (2) when the client is uncooperative; 98 (3) when the
attorney and client suffer a breakdown in communication;99 (4) when
the client degrades the attorney; 10 0 (5) when the client refuses to pay
justified attorney fees and costs; 10 1 (6) when the client refuses to accept
95.
Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 239, 868 P.2d at 882 (citing WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a)).
96. Id. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4.
97. Id.; see Matheny v. Farley, 66 S.E. 1060, 1061 (1910) (holding that when a client
demands that the attorney perform an illegal or unprofessional act, or carry out a malicious or
unlawful design, withdrawal may be for good cause); see, e.g., Tucker v. Rio Optical Corp., 20
Kan. App. 2d 233, 236, 885 P.2d 1270, 1272 (1994) (in which client demanded that the
appellants bribe the judge); Clark v. Nichols, 111 N.Y.S. 66, 66 (1908) (in which attorney
learned six months after initiation of suit that client claimed more damages than actually
suffered).
98. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4; see also General Brewing Co. v.
Gordon, 694 F.2d 190, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that client stipulated to withdrawal based
on failure to communicate and cooperate); Kannewurf v. Johns, 632 N.E. 2d 711, 714 (1994)
(noting that, among other acts, client refused to cooperate in attempts to negotiate claim with
insurance carrier); Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of America, 524 N.W. 2d 500, 502
(1994) (client's continued failure to sign authorization pursuant to order to compel production of
documents); Dempsey v. Dorrance, 132 S.W. 33, 34 (1910) (client broke off all communication).
But see In re Estate of Falco, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 808 (1987) (stating that mutual animosity and
disagreements regarding settlements was insufficient); Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 238, 868 P.2d at
881; Falco, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
99. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4; e.g., Dempsey, 132 S.W. 33, 34
(1910); General Brewing Co., 694 F.2d 190, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Ausler, 73 Wash.
App. at 238, 868 P.2d at 881; Falco, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
100. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4; see, e.g., Matheny, 66 S.E.
1060, 1061 (noting that client attempted to sustain case by the subordination of witnesses); Reed
Yates Farm, Inc. v. Yates, 526 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (1988) (noting that client filed disciplinary
grievance); Genrow v. Flynn, 131 N.W. 1115, 1115 (1911) (noting that client wrote to attorney
"you have deceived, lied, and neglected me in every possible way you could... [and] I don't
intend to stand your abuse any longer"); Matarrese v. Wilson, 118 N.Y.S. 2d 5, 9 (1952) (noting
that client told attorney that the only reason the settlement offer was recommended was because
the attorney needed money).
101. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4; see, e.g., Upgrade Corp. v.
Mich. Carton Co., 410 N.E.2d 159, 161 (1980) (fee dispute over unpaid fees); Reed Yates Farm,
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a settlement offer; 1 2 or (7) when the ethical rules require the attorney
to withdraw.0 3 Attorneys should withdraw and assert an attorney lien
only when they are certain that they have good cause to do so. The
Ausler standard delineates when an attorney has good cause to
withdraw from representation in Washington. When the attorney
does not have good cause to withdraw, the court will likely hold the
attorney lien void." 4 Recall that an improperly asserted attorney lien
is likely to constitute an ethical violation.' 5
C. Termination of Contingency Fee Relationships
In Washington, when a client agrees to pay an attorney under a
contingency fee agreement and terminates the attorney before
occurrence of the contingency, the attorney may recover based on
quantum meruit.1 6 In contrast to withdrawal, this rule applies
whether the client terminates the relationship with or without cause."17
However, there are two exceptions to this rule. First, if an attorney
violates the RPCs, then compensation is not available.108 Second, if
the attorney substantially performs the duties owed to the client, then
the attorney may recover the full contingency, not just quantum
meruit. 1°
'
The substantial performance exception only applies in the

526 N.E.2d at 111 (client failed to pay fees after a reasonable time). But see Charles Weiner
Corp. v. D. Jack Davis Corp., 448 N.Y.S.2d 998, 999 (1982) (stating that when litigation has
begun, the attorney's right to withdrawal is not absolute).
102. See, e.g., Kannewurf, 632 N.E.2d at 714; Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237
N.W.2d 520, 522 (1975) (in which the client refused to accept fair, reasonable, and equitable
settlement that was in the best interests of the client and did not cooperate). But see Ausler, 73
Wash. App. at 237, 868 P.2d at 880 (accepting a settlement offer was explicitly excluded from its
ruling); Falco,233 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
103. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4; see also WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2004). For other examples of these factors, see George L. Blum,
Annotation, Circumstances Under Which Attorney Retains Right to CompensationNotwithstanding
Voluntary Withdrawalfrom Case, 53 A.L.R.Sth 287-374 (1997).
104. Ausler, 73 Wash. App. at 236 n.4, 868 P.2d at 880 n.4.
105. See, e.g., Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 609-10, 647 P.2d 1004, 1009 (1982); cf.
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8()(1); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.8(i)(1) (2003).
106. Barr v. Day, 124 Wash. 2d 318, 329, 879 P.2d 912, 917 (1994) (citing Ross, 97 Wash.
2d at 608-09, 647 P.2d at 1010).
107. Kimball v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Douglas County, 64 Wash. 2d 252, 257, 391
P.2d 205, 208-09 (1964).
108. Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 610, 647 P.2d at 1010-11; Gustafson v. Seattle, 87 Wash. App.
298, 304, 941 P.2d 701, 704 (1997).
109. Barr, 124 Wash. 2d at 329, 879 P.2d at 918; Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 608-09, 647 P.2d at
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rare case where full performance is delinquent by "minor and
relatively unimportant deviations."'110
Washington attorneys must consider the extent of services
provided to determine the appropriate fee calculation when asserting a
lien. Whether the attorney substantially completed the duties owed to
the client depends on how much time elapsed between termination
and satisfaction of the contingency."' To illustrate, in Barr v. Day,
the client, Barr fired attorney Day eleven months before a settlement
was reached and before commencing negotiations.1 The court held
that Day had not substantially performed his duties and that his fees
were limited to quantum meruit.1 3 In contrast, in Taylor v. Shigaki,
the client, Taylor, fired his attorney, Zeder, only nine days before the
14
trial date and six hours before a settlement was reached."
Additionally, before Zeder was terminated, he obtained a substantial
settlement offer for Taylor.'
In that case, the court held that Zeder
had substantially performed his duties and was entitled to full
recovery according to the contingency fee agreement of the settlement
Zeder obtained."6 If the client owes the attorney fees, the attorney
may use the lien statute as an enforcement mechanism. Whether the
attorney substantially performed will determine whether the lien will
be enforceable for the full contingency or quantum meruit.
D. Limitationson Retaining Liens: Enforcing the Retaining Lien on a
Former Client's Files
This section discusses how limitations on the retaining lien in
Washington have made the subsection 1 lien worthless. Then it
explains a different approach adopted by the Illinois courts, arguing
that Washington should adopt the Illinois standard.
1. The Washington Retaining Lien
Summary procedure, which gives courts discretion to resolve any
dispute regarding the lien, is available for a quick resolution of the
retaining lien." 7 The summary procedure permits a judge to require
110. Taylor v. Shigaki, 84 Wash. App. 723, 729, 930 P.2d 340, 343 (1997) (citing 17 AM.
JUR. 2D, Contracts § 634 (1991)).
111. See Barr, 214 Wash. 2d at 329-30, 879 P.2d at 918.
112. Id. at 329, 879 P.2d at 918.
113. Id. at 330, 879 P.2d at 918.
114. Taylor, 84 Wash. App. at 729, 930 P.2d at 343-44.
115. Id. at 730, 930 P.2dat 343-44.
116. Id., 930 P.2d at 344. Zeder did not claim that Taylor owed him a percentage of the
final settlement, only the percentage of the settlement figure procured by Zeder. Id.
117. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 60.40.030(2) (2002).
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In
the client to provide adequate security or to resolve the dispute.'
other words, a court may require relinquishment of the lien in
replacement for a lien on some other property owned by the client.
Summary procedure, however, does not apply to any other property
besides papers or money secured for payment of fees." 9 Even though
the summary procedure statute seems straightforward, the ethics
opinions have limited the retaining lien to the point that it is useless.
The WSBA attempted to abrogate the retaining lien on the
papers of the client. 2 ° Recall that the retaining lien on the papers of
the client gives the attorney the right to hold the client's files hostage
when fees are due,' 2 ' and its primary use is to force a client into paying
through embarrassment or worry.2 2 The WSBA Formal Opinion 181
establishes the following standard: if assertion of the lien prejudices
the client, the duty to protect the former client's interests supersedes
the right to assert the lien.' 23 Additionally, a client's need of his or her24
files will almost always be presumed if the client requests them.
However, the lien is only effective as leverage when the client wants or
needs the property retained. 2 As a result, the retaining lien is useless
because an attorney cannot worry a client into paying by holding the
client's files hostage if the attorney is required to turn them over when
the client requests them.
WSBA Formal Opinion 181 further limited the retaining lien
when the files relate to current legal representation. 126 Lien rights do
not exist when there is any possibility that the lien will interfere with27
the client's self-representation or representation by a new lawyer.'
Conversely, if the client has the ability to pay, and when there is no

118. Seeid. § 60.40.030(1).
119. Golden v. Hyde, 117 Wash. 677, 680,202 P. 272, 273 (1921); see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 60.40.020.
120. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987).
121. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 60.40.010(1).
122. Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 511, 65 P. 753 (1901) (stating that the
retaining lien may "be used to embarrass the client, or, in some cases express it, to worry him
into the payment of the charges").
123. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987).
124. Id.
125. See Frenkel v. Frenkel 599 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1991) (quoting Brauer v. Hotel Ass'n,
Inc. 40 N.J. 415, 422-23, 192 A.2d 831 (1963)). In Frenkel, the court reasoned that if the
retained property is of no subjective value to the former client, then the lien is worthless, but
when the subjective value surpasses the owed fees, then the client will likely pay the fees and
receive the property. Id.
126. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987).
127. Id.
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the amount of fees, it is proper for an attorney to assert
dispute over
128
the lien.
The WSBA opinion is confusing and illogical because the lien is
only effective when the client wants or needs the files for some use
other than legal representation, and the attorney asserting the lien can
rebut the presumption that the client actually needs the files.
Moreover, if the client seeks protection through the summary
procedure statute, the client will enjoy a presumption that the files are
needed.129 In this situation, a court may require the client to provide
adequate security, but most likely the security will provide less
leverage than the client's files.13 ° In short, the WSBA opinion has
removed much of the leverage from the retaining lien, making it
significantly less effective.
In addition to being confusing and illogical, WSBA Formal
Opinion 181 is not binding authority on Washington courts. 131 The
Washington Supreme Court adopted RPC 1.15(d),' 32 which provides
that "the lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.' ' 133 As explained above, the WSBA Formal
Opinion 181 attempts to abrogate the retaining lien, reasoning that 13it4
is only valid as leverage when the client does not need the property.
The WSBA opinion fails to cite to any case or statutory authority for
this position; 13 instead, it borrows language from ABA Informal
Opinion 86-1520,136 which also was not adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court. 37 Such abrogation is without precedent and only
binding in a disciplinary review, not a judicial hearing on the validity
of a retaining lien. As a result, WSBA Opinion 181 is only relevant as
persuasion, and courts will have to approach the issue as one of first
impression.
128. Id. For practical reasons, a reasonable attorney would not likely assert a lien against a
former client who is unable to pay.
129. Id.
130. Otherwise, the client would simply permit the attorney to keep the files.
131. The WSBA Formal Opinions are approved and adopted by the Association's Board of
Governors, not the Washington Supreme Court. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N,
RESOURCES 406 (Allison L. Parker ed., 2001-2002).
132. Barrie Althoff, Preface, WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON LAWYER
DISCIPLINE MANUAL, at i (Feb. 28, 2002).
133. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2004). The "other law" permitting
the retaining lien is RCW subsection 60.40.010(1). WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(l) (2002).
134. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987). In effect, the opinion amounts to an
abrogation because if a client does not need the property, then there is no leverage and the lien is
impotent.
135. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987).
136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1520 (1986)
(replacing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1461 (1980)).
137. See Althoff, supra note 132, at i.
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Moreover, this ambiguity is troubling when a former client files a
bar complaint and moves for resolution of the dispute through the
summary procedure statute. If the court refuses to follow WSBA
Formal Opinion 181, the lien may be valid according to the statute
and yet be the cause of ethical discipline for an attorney. Such
inconsistency can only further dissuade attorneys from asserting liens
properly or asserting them altogether.
2. A Different Approach
At least one court has applied a different standard for
determining when a retaining lien is proper.'38 For example, in LuckyGoldstar International, Inc. v. International Manufacturing Sales Co.,
the defendant, International Manufacturing Sales Company ("IMS"),
hired Conklin & Adler, Ltd. ("C&A") for representation in a breach
of contract action brought by Lucky-Goldstar International, Inc.
("Lucky"). 3 9
Approximately six months after commencing
representation, C&A withdrew with leave of the court and consent of
IMS. 40 IMS then retained other counsel and continued its defense.'
When IMS subpoenaed C&A for delivery of its files pursuant to a
discovery request by Lucky, C&A asserted an attorney's lien on the
files of IMS, demanding payment of substantial fees.' 42
The court, faced with the same dilemma that the Washington
standard presents, held that the lien was valid.'
However, the court
held that in the interest of judicial efficiency, the files must be
produced if the former client posts adequate security.' 44 The court
also reasoned that the rules on ethics are not helpful because they do
not resolve the issue; rather, the rules merely state that a properly
asserted lien is ethical while an improperly asserted lien is unethical. 4 '
In addition, the court in Lucky based its analysis on the idea that
the aim of the lien on client files is to provide access to needed
documents without prejudicing the rights of either party.'46 The court
sought to balance the interests of the attorney, the client, and others
who might be substantially affected.'4 7 The court indicated that the
138. Lucky-Goldstar Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Mfg. Sales Co., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (applying Illinois law).
139. Id. at 1060.
140. Id. at 1060-61.
141. Id. at 1061.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1064.
144. Id. at 1062.
145. Id. at 1062-63
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1063.
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attorney should consider the following factors before asserting a
retaining lien on the former client's files:
(1) the financial situation of the client, (2) the sophistication of
the client in dealing with lawyers, (3) whether the fee is
reasonable, (4) whether the client clearly understood and agreed
to pay the amount now owing, (5) whether imposition of the
retaining lien would prejudice the important rights or interests
of the client or of other parties, (6) whether failure to impose the
lien would result in fraud or gross imposition by the client, and
(7) whether there are less stringent means by which the matter
8
14
can be resolved or by which the amount owing can be secured.
The court also noted that if the files are requested for defense in
a criminal action or in defending a similarly important personal
liberty, the lawyer should not ordinarily assert the lien. 149 Unlike
Washington's rebuttable presumption standard, the Lucky court
50
placed the burden on the former client to show need of the files.'
The court ultimately denied C&A's motion to quash the subpoena on
the condition that IMS tender adequate security. 5' The following
facts were particularly relevant to the court's decision: the record did
not indicate an improper assertion of the lien, the files were not
necessary for defense of a criminal charge or personal liberty, and IMS
was able to pay the fee. 5 2 Balancing the interests of the attorney as
well as the client, the court found that the lien was valid and should
not be dismissed. However, to avoid delay in the present proceeding,
security to the attorneys in
the court held that IMS could provide
53
exchange for the retained property.
3. Washington Should Adopt the Lucky Approach
Washington courts should adopt the standard set forth in Lucky,
which shifts the burden to the former client to show need for the files
and distinguishes between needing the files for defense of "important"
rights and for other uses."' First, the Lucky court places the burden
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also In re Garcia, 76 B.R. 68, 69 (1987) (stating that the retaining lien is valid
subject only to a situation where a former client's fundamental rightswould be impaired); cf. Fed.
Land Bank of Jackson v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Jackson, 128 F.R.D. 182, 186 (1989)
(interpreting Lucky to indicate that a retaining lien should not be set aside absent a showing of
fraud or gross imposition by the client).
150. Lucky, 636 F. Supp. at 1063 (citing Pomerantz v. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 683 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
151. Id. at 1060.
152. Id. at 1064.
153. Id. at 1064-65.
154. Id. at 1063.
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on the client to show a need for the files.' 55 For example, if the former
client needs the files for defense of a criminal charge, it would be very
easy for the former client to provide a copy of the charging
information to the court. In contrast, if the reverse were required, it
would be nearly impossible for the attorney to prove a negative
proposition-that the client does not need the files.
Second, the standard set forth in Lucky distinguishes between
criminal defense and other cases, presumably because the
consequences resulting from the lien are typically more severe when
needed for a criminal defense. This standard widens the scope of the
retaining lien. Further, it offers attorneys a list of factors to consider
when deciding whether to assert a lien. Implementing a logical and
comprehensible approach increases the likelihood that an attorney will
only assert a lien when appropriate, and it lessens the practice of
improperly asserted liens. Without a list of factors to rely on,
attorneys will either refrain from asserting a retaining lien because the
amount of money available is not worth the risk of an improperly
asserted lien and an ethical violation,'56 or they will improperly rely on
the seemingly plain language of the statute and misapply the law
altogether.
E. Limitations on ChargingLiens
In addition to the retaining lien, the charging lien has been
limited such that it is undefined, unpredictable, and illogical. First,
the RPCs limit the lien on money in the attorney's hands such that it
is only possible to assert the lien as a retaining lien.'57 Second, liens
are not permitted on certain types of property: namely, child support
funds and real property.'
Third, attorney liens are not enforceable
against settlement proceeds. 9
1. Liens on the Client's Money in the Attorney's Possession.
In Washington, the current enforcement status of a lien on a
client's money in the attorney's possession is unclear. The subsection
2 lien, which provides a lien on a client's money in the attorney's

155. See id.
156. See generally Althoff, supra note 78, at 47 (concluding that attorneys should almost
never assert attorney liens, but should instead consider the representation as involuntary pro
bono service because the risks and burdens are simply too high for the potential benefits).
157. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a)(2) (2004).
158. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977); Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash.
2d 598, 647 P.2d 1004 (1982).
159. Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 242, 106 P. 742, 743 (1910).
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possession, was originally a charging lien.16 However, in Ross v.
Scannell, the Washington Supreme Court summarily indicated
otherwise. 6' The ethical rules do not permit a subsection 2 lien if
there is a fee dispute. 162 Thus, an attorney can only use a subsection 2
lien when the client does not dispute the fee. However, Washington
courts have not yet encountered this situation, and it does not seem
likely that one will arise. Moreover, under the summary procedure
statute, a client's rights can be protected if the subsection 2 lien is
asserted as a retaining lien.' 63 The lien on money in the attorney's
hands, as a charging lien, is impracticable; the statute should be
amended to classify it as a retaining lien.
In 1901, the Washington Supreme Court explained that the
special or charging lien applies to "judgments, money in hand, or in
the hands of adverse party after notice. "164 The Washington Court of
Appeals held similarly in Crane Co. v. Paul.6 ' The attorney in Crane,
James Henry, performed legal services for plaintiff Crane Company
from 1964 to 1967.166 In 1970, Crane retained Henry a second time,
67
but Crane was dissatisfied with the service provided by Henry.
Crane discharged Henry and directed him to return the files and
funds. 6 At that time, Henry held almost four thousand dollars in
trust, belonging to Crane. 169 Henry sent the files and a check for the
amount held in trust; however, Henry claimed that Crane owed him"
almost $6000 for fees and costs advanced. 17 When Crane's new
7
attorneys notified Henry that his fees would have to be itemized,' '
Henry cancelled the check and gave notice of his intent to assert a lien
7
72
Crane and Henry both filed suit.1 1
on the money in his possession.
160. Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 510-11, 65 P. 753, 753-54 (1901).
161. See Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 605, 647 P.2d at 1008.
162. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a)(2); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(e) (2003).
163. See generally 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.26. A subsection 2 lien, as a retaining lien (limited
by RPC 1.14(a)(2), WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a)(2)), requires attorneys to
hold any disputed funds in trust; however, as a charging lien, the subsection 2 lien permits
attorneys to convert the funds to their own. Id.
164. Gottstein, 25 Wash. at 510-11, 65 P. at 753-54 (1901).
165. 15 Wash. App. 212, 214, 548 P.2d 337, 339 (1976).
166. Id. at 213, 548 P.2d at 338.
167. Id. at 214, 548 P.2d at 339.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Under the current RPCs, Crane would have been required to state in writing the basis
or rate of his fees or the factors involved in determining the charges. See WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2004).
172. Crane, 15 Wash. App. at 213-14, 548 P.2d at 338.
173. Id. at 212, 548 P.2d at 338.
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The Court of Appeals held that Henry properly asserted the lien
and offset his fees by converting the client's trust funds to his own
personal use.174 The court also awarded judgment in favor of Henry
for the balance of his fees. 7 The court reasoned that Henry had
abided by the ethical rule DR 9-102(B)(4),' 7 6 which required an
attorney to promptly pay or deliver to his client funds "which the
client is entitled to receive.""'17 However, the court did not address the
then current ethical rule DR 9-102(A)(2), 7 ' which required Henry to
hold the funds in trust without converting them because there was a
dispute over the amount of fees owed.' 79 Crane failed to argue that
Henry violated the ethical rules, and the court concluded that Crane
80
was not entitled to the funds once the lien was asserted.
Six years later, the Washington Supreme Court indirectly
attacked the charging status of the subsection 2 lien.181 In Ross v.
Scannell, the issue before the court was the validity of an attorney's
lien on real property as the judgment. 8 2 Nonetheless, the court stated
that "five states, including Washington, recognize a charging lien
upon the judgment only,"' 83 but it is unclear whether the court
intended to exclude liens on the client's money in the attorney's
possession or in the hands of an adverse party. This statement,
however, is dicta and not binding on lower courts because the lien on a
client's money in the attorney's possession was not a question before
the court. Two paragraphs before announcing that charging liens only
apply to judgments, the court also failed to include liens on the client's

174. Id. at 213-14, 548 P.2d at 338-39.
175. Id. at 214-16, 548 P.2d at 339-40.
176. Id. at 215, 548 P.2d at 339. The current controlling rule is RPC 1.14(b)(4). WASH.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 14(b)(4) (2004).
177. See Crane, 15 Wash. App. at 215,548 P.2d at 339-40.
178. WASH. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(B)(4). The current controlling
rule, RPC 1.14(a)(2), is similar to the no-longer-controlling Washington Disciplinary Rule 9102(A)(2). WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a)(2) (2003); WASH. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(A)(2); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.15(e) (2003). See generally Althoff, supra note 132, at i (discussing the revision of the
Washington lawyer discipline system).
179. See Crane, 15 Wash. App. at 213, 548 P.2d at 339.
180. Id. at 215, 548 P.2d at 340.
181. Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 605, 647 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1982). This was an
indirect attack because the issue of a subsection 2 lien was not before the court.
182. Id. at 599-600, 647 P.2d at 1005-06 (the underlying case was for specific performance
of a plot of land).
183. Id. at 605, 647 P.2d at 1008.
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money when describing the retaining lien.' 84 Moreover, the court did
not address subsection 2 liens anywhere in the opinion."' 5
Despite the court's dicta in Ross, the WSBA cited Ross for the
proposition that "attorneys have a 'retaining' or 'possessory' lien
under RCW section 60.40.010 against papers or money in the lawyer's
possession [which] cannot be foreclosed."'' 1 6 This language was not
taken directly from the Ross decision, and it is unclear that the court
the Crane decision. In fact, the evidence
actually intended to overrule
187
points to the contrary.
Recall that in Jones, where the attorney asserted a lien under
subsections 3 and 4 for fees owed from a previous defense
representation,' the Washington Court of Appeals did not adopt the
Washington Supreme Court's dicta in Ross because doing so would
effectively render a lien on money in the hands of an 9adverse party
superfluous"' if it could only be filed on a judgment. ' The court
stated that the Ross court "ignored subsection 3 in its discussion of the
attorney's liens authorized by the statute .... [W]e do not read the
Ross dicta as applying to subsection 3."19 Similarly, the court's dicta
in Ross did not address liens on money in the attorney's hands.
Consistent with Jones, Washington courts may recognize the limited
scope of the dicta in Ross and continue to permit the lien on the
client's money in the attorney's possession to be enforceable as a
charging lien-thereby rejecting the language of WSBA Formal
Opinion 181.
The subsection 2 lien should be classified as a retaining lien. If a
court held that a subsection 2 lien was a charging lien, the client's
right to dispute the fee would be violated. 192 RPC 1.14(a)(2) restricts
attorneys from asserting a subsection 2 lien when there is a fee
dispute.19 3 An attorney may anticipate that a client who refuses to pay
184. Id., 647 P.2d at 1007 (1982) (implying that the subsection 2 lien is not a retaining lien,
but is a charging lien).
185. See generally Ross, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 647 P.2d 1004.
186. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 181 (1987) (emphasis added).
187. See Jones v. International Land Corp. Ltd., 51 Wash. App. 737, 755 P.2d 184 (1988);
27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.26 (noting that "[t]he lien does have a basic characteristic of a retaining lien
in that it requires possession, but it should not be limited to that status so far as enforcement is
concerned").
188. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 738, 755 P.2d at 185.
189. Id. Subsection 3 liens were also excluded when the Ross court stated that "Five states,
including Washington, recognize a charging lien upon the judgment only." Ross, 97 Wash. 2d
598, 605, 647 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1982).
190. Jones, 51 Wash. App. at 741-42, 755 P.2d at 187.
191. Id. at 742, 755 P.2d at 187.
192. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a)(2) (2004).
193. Id.
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will also dispute the fee, and RPC 1.14(a)(2) prohibits the attorney
from asserting the charging lien in such a situation. If, on the other
hand, the attorney asserts a retaining lien, the matter is likely to be
resolved under the summary procedure statute. 194 Significantly, under
that statute, the client's rights are protected because a court would
resolve the fee dispute. Moreover, asserting the lien as a retaining lien
is consistent with RPC 1.14(a)(2), because the funds would not be
withdrawn until the dispute is resolved.' 95 In short, a lien on money in
the attorney's hands should be classified as a retaining lien to protect
attorneys from ethical violations and to preserve the client's right to
dispute the fees.
2. What Types of Property are Subject to a Charging Lien on a
Judgment?
While courts have been unclear when interpreting subsection 2
liens, courts have been unpredictable when interpreting liens on a
judgment under subsection 4.
a. Child Support Funds
Washington courts, without much controversy, do not allow a
lien against child support or alimony judgments.'96 In Fuqua v.
Fuqua, the Washington Supreme Court adjudicated two companion
cases.1 97 'Inthe first case, attorney Meier represented Mrs. Brudijean
Fuqua in a divorce proceeding in which Mrs. Fuqua received custody
of her four children and child support from the father.' 98 Meier later
asserted an attorney lien against the judgment comprised of those
payments.' 99 In the second case, attorney Chawla represented Karen
Kaur in a private action, in which Ms. Kaur received custody of her
child and $2000 past support plus $75 per month."' Chawla filed
notice of an attorney lien for $1000 and $37.50 per month to be paid
out of the child support payments.20 ' While Washington's attorney
lien statute is silent on the matter of liens attached to judgments
194. See 27 WASH. PRAC. § 4.26 (stating that "[i]t is likely that the summary procedure
will most often be invoked when an attorney has a lien on a client's moneys... [but also noting]
enforcement of the lien should not be limited to summary adjudication).
195.

WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 14(a)(2).

196. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d i00, 107, 558 P.2d 801, 805 (1977).
197. Id. at 101, 558 P.2d at 802.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. It is unclear if these payments to the attorney were limited to a certain amount of
time or a certain amount of money.
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202

composed of child support payment, the court ruled that as a matter
of public policy, such liens would not be permitted. 2 3 The court
relied on the premise that such payments are not for the benefit of the
client and compromise the basic needs of the children.0 4
Additionally, the court extended this ruling to apply to all charging
liens including liens on money in the hands of an adverse party and on
money in the attorney's hands belonging to the client.2" 5 This issue
has not since been debated, and the court is, for good reason, unlikely
to change its position.
b. Real Property as the Judgment
Additionally and more controversially, Washington courts have
ruled that attorney liens cannot attach to real property.2" 6 In Ross v.
Scannell, attorney Lawrence Ross sought fees through assertion of an
attorney lien from his business partner and client, William Scannell.2" 7
Mr. Scannell, a real estate broker, negotiated for the purchase of a plot
of land of 1410 acres.20 8
Pursuant to Scannell's inquiry, Ross
summoned a small group of investors, including himself, to become
partners in a joint venture to purchase the land.2 °9 Scannell was unable
to acquire the land because the owners refused or were unable to clear
title to the property, ending the joint venture.2 10 Scannell, who was
counseled by Ross under a contingent fee agreement, brought suit
against the sellers seeking specific performance of the 1410 acres. 21'
The contingent fee agreement indicated that if specific performance
were awarded, then Ross' fee would depend in part on the value of the
land.212 After the action was filed, McKinney, one of the partners of
the joint venture, sued Scannell for breach of fiduciary duty;213 Ross

202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(4) (2002).
203. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d 100, 106-07, 558 P.2d 801, 804-05.
204. Id. (citing decisions from several other jurisdictions in support of this policy-based
ruling).
205. Id. at 107, 558 P.2d at 805 (holding that "as a matter of public policy, statutory
attorney's liens may not be asserted against monies which represent payments for child
support," and reasoning that any effort to assert such a lien is void, whether it be against funds
in the hands of (1) the clerk, (2) the lawful custodian of the children, or (3) an attorney). The
relevant statutes are RCW subsections 60.40.010(2) and (3).
206. Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wash. 2d 598, 599-600, 647 P.2d at 1005 (1982).
207. Id. at 600-03, 647 P.2d at 1005-07.
208. Id. at 600, 647 P.2d at 1005.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 600-01, 647 P.2d at 1006.
213. Id. at 600, 647 P.2d at 1006.
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agreed to represent Scannell in that case and the prior action. 14 Near
the trial, Ross hired Mr. Warren Peterson on an hourly basis to try the
case because Ross realized that he would likely be called as a
witness. 21 The trial court entered judgment for Scannell in the first
action for 960 acres: $32,499 in damages, and $2500 previously paid
by Scannell as a down payment.2 16 Scannell offered Ross a one-third
equity participation in the 960 acres plus one third of $32,499.217 Ross
claimed he was entitled to one-third of the profits derived from the
subsequent sale of the property plus one third of $32,499.218 Ross
then filed an attorney lien on the property at issue.219
The court in Ross reasoned that because other states' statutes
specifically provide for liens on a judgment of real property and
because Washington's statute does not, the Legislature did not intend
to include real property under subsection 4 of the statute. 220 The court
indicated that there are other remedies available to the attorney, such
as suing the client for fees and attaching the client's real property to a
judgment lien. 221 Primarily, the court reasoned that allowing attorneys
to burden property before any adjudication on the claim could give
attorneys improper bargaining power over their clients.222 Thus, it is
likely that the court would have been more comfortable with a lien on
the former client's real property if it accompanied a proceeding to
settle the dispute.
While the court's holding in Ross is defensible on policy
grounds, the court's other reasons are problematic. First, the court
stated that the statute at issue, RCW section 60.40.010, should be
strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common law.223
However, the court's analysis did not rely on strict construction of the
statute. Rather, the court relied on the fact that the statute did not
expressly provide for liens on real property.224 Strictly interpreting the
' ' 22 1 implies an understanding that the statute
words
"upon
provides
that a ajudgment,
lien will attach
to any judgment, not all judgments

214. Id.
215. Id. at 601, 647 P.2d at 1006. In fact, Ross was the principal witness. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 601-02, 647 P.2d at 1006.
219. Id. at 602-03, 647 P.2d at 1006.
220. Id. at 605, 647 P.2d at 1008.
221. Id. at 605-06, 647 P.2d at 1008.
222. See id. at 606, 647 P.2d 1008-09.
223. Id.
224. Id. The court in Ross reasoned that because the statute does not specifically include
real property, the Legislature must have intended it to be excluded. Id.
225. See WASH. REV. CODE §60.40.010(4) (2002).
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except those comprised of real property. This is especially true
because subsections 2 and 3 expressly exclude all property except
money, and subsection 4 liens do not expressly exclude any type of
property.226
Second, the court's approach is unpredictable. If "judgment" in
subsection 4 does not include real property and does not expressly
limit the lien to money, the types of property comprising the judgment
that are subject to the lien are unclear. This construction leaves the
practitioner with little guidance regarding whether the court is likely
to exclude any other type of property from the statute.
Third, the majority in Ross failed to consider the powerful
disincentives to asserting questionable attorney liens, which severely
punish many of the attorneys who ignore such risks. 227 Ross ignored
such risks in this case. He represented parties in a dispute over a
transaction in which he was involved. 22' Ross was a key witness, yet
he continued to ignore this conflict of interest. 229 As a result, the court
could have declared Ross' lien invalid because he was in violation of
the RPCs.23 °
Nonetheless, the court's policy rationale, imbued with a
reluctance to punish attorneys, is persuasive. The idea that attorney
liens on real property give too much leverage to attorneys because
clients will often be forced to settle the claim for fees based on the
client's need for the property underlies the court's analysis. 231' The
distinction between money and real property makes a difference here
because land is unique. While the client can replace money, it is
unlikely that the client would be able to replace land.
The message from Fuqua and Ross is that if the lien gives the
attorney too much leverage, a court may rule that it no longer applies
to that type of property. Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the
legislature have defined what constitutes too much leverage.
Attorneys should beware: this may be a trend toward applying the
WSBA's view on retaining liens to liens upon judgments.
226. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(2)-(3), with id. § 60.40.010(4).
227. Recall that attorneys who assert liens must comply with the RPCs or else the lien will
be invalid and the attorney will be subject to discipline. See Althoff, supra note 78, at 47 (stating
that attorneys should weigh heavily whether collecting from the client is worth the effort and
risk, because most lawyers would be far better off by considering the time spent on the case as
involuntary pro bono).
228. Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 600, 647 P.2d at 1005-06.
229. Id. at 601, 647 P.2d at 1006. After Scannell questioned Ross about his dual role, Ross
assured him that he could serve as both attorney and witness. Id.
230. See id. at 607, 647 P.2d at 1009; see also WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5,
1.7, 3.7 (2004).
231. Ross, 97 Wash. 2d at 606, 647 P.2d at 1009.
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3. Liens on Settlement Proceeds

Another potential arena of dispute is whether an attorney can
assert a charging lien against a client's settlement. Washington's
attorney lien statute permits charging liens on money in hand,232
money in the hands of an adverse party,233 and for the judgment,234
suggesting that the lien does not apply to settlements. In fact,
Washington courts have specifically ruled that an attorney lien on the
judgment does not apply to settlements. 23 5 For example, in Cline
Piano Co. v. Sherwood, the plaintiffs received a judgment in their favor
against defendant Cline Piano Company. 236 The plaintiffs' attorneys
filed a lien on the judgment under RCW subsection 60.40.010(4).237
The court announced judgment from the bench; 23" but unfortunately
for the plaintiffs' attorneys, the parties settled before the court entered
a final judgment.2 39 The court, therefore, ruled that there was no
official judgment because the case settled before the judgment was
formally entered.24 ° As a result, the lien on the judgment was invalid
because there was no judgment. 24' However, the court provided a
safeguard that if the client's settlement was intended to defeat the
attorney's lien, the attorney may then require the hearing to
continue.242 Ultimately, the court reasoned that the attorney filed a
lien upon the judgment, and the court had not entered a final
judgment.243
The effect of Cline Piano is that if a non-paying client settles the
case before judgment, the attorney cannot use a lien to secure
compensation. Here, the attorney must resort to other less attractive
collection methods.2 44 This situation is rare, and the attorney could
232. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(2) (2002).
233. See id. § 60.40.010(3).
234. See id. § 60.40.010(4).
235. Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57 Wash. 239, 242, 106 P. 742, 743 (1910).
236. Id. at 240-41,106 P. at 742.
237. Id. at 241, 106 P. at 743.
238. Id. at 242, 106 P. at 743.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 243, 106 P. at 744; accord Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162, 170, 724 P.2d
1069, 1074 (1986) (citing Suleiman v. Cantino, 33 Wash. App. 602, 606-07, 656 P.2d 1122,
1124 (1983) (stating that attorney liens are invalid under RCW subsections 60.40.010(3) or (4)
where the attorney was unsuccessful in obtaining a judgment for the client)).
242. Cline Piano Co., 57 Wash. at 243-44, 106 P. at 744.
243. Id.
244. The most obvious alternative is to bring suit for fees. However, several other options
are also available. See, e.g., Laurie Berke-Weiss, Getting Paid: Good Ideas That Work and Are
Ethical, 60 PRACTICING LAW INST., N.Y. PRAC. SKILLS COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 143, 145
(Oct. 1999); J. Lindsay Short, Jr. & Lynne Little St. Leger, You've Earned It... Now How Do
You Collect?, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1988, at 27.
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have avoided this problem by providing for such compensation in the
fee agreement prior to representation. A more likely scenario is one in
which an attorney provides representation for several months, and the
client uses that representation to gain some leverage against the other
party, ultimately settling the action and then refuses to pay; in this
scenario, there is no recourse for the attorney under the Washington
Attorney Lien Statute.24
Refusing attorney liens to attach settlement proceeds raises two
issues. First, an attorney may instruct the opposing party to pay the
settlement funds to their office to be deposited in trust. Then,
attorneys can assert a lien under subsection 2 on the client's money in
the hands of the attorney. 24 6 However, it may be problematic when
the former client seeks judicial inquiry into the matter under RCW
section 60.40.030,247 because the court will likely be persuaded that the
subsection 2 lien was actually an attempt to circumvent the settlement
restriction on the subsection 4 lien. Additionally, if attorneys
manipulate such situations, clients will be unwilling to trust attorneys
to control their funds. Such trickery may not be an ethical violation,
but manipulating statutes in which misuse can bring harsh
consequences is risky business. This process finds support in an
unpublished opinion from the Ninth Circuit. 248 In that case, the court
reasoned that there was no rule or law prohibiting a law firm from
249
asserting a lien on settlement money in its possession.
Unfortunately, the court did not cite any authority for its position, and
there are no published Washington cases addressing the validity of
such a lien. Therefore, it is unclear whether converting the interest in
the settlement proceeds into a subsection 2 lien is actually a valid
option.
Second, in some situations, this restriction will lead to unfair and
absurd results. For example, a client may terminate an attorney
without good cause and seek alternate counsel, who assists in
obtaining judgment for the client. In that situation, the former
attorney could receive compensation through a lien on the judgment to
245. See generally Cline Piano Co., 57 Wash. at 242, 106 P. at 743. Recall that an attorney
cannot recover settlement proceeds under a lien upon money in the hands of an adverse party,
because a judgment is required under subsection 3. Wilson, 45 Wash. App. at 167, 170, 724
P.2d at 1072, 1074.
246. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010(2) (2002).
247. See id. §60.40.030.
248. Nisqually Indian Tribe v. City of Centralia, 1994 WL 58981 at "3 (9th Cir. Feb 25,
1994) (stating that "[n]othing prohibits the firm from filing liens on the settlement money in its
possession to cover all of the costs and fees of all of the attorneys who associated in the course of
the litigation and who were to be compensated under the same contract").
249. Id.
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be determined based on quantum meruit. But, where the client settles
the action, the attorney may have to sue to recover fees. In both
situations, the attorney provided the same services from which the
former client benefited, but depending on how the client receives the
remedy, the attorney may not be eligible for compensation through a
lien. Since the statute does not provide for a lien on settlement
proceeds, this rule is unlikely to change. Attorneys should be aware of
this limitation and provide for compensation through their fee
agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Attorney Lien Statute is now limited in ways
that prevent it from serving its purpose. The statute was designed to
simultaneously protect the rights of both the client and the attorney.
While some limitations on the statute are necessary, other limitations
imposed by court opinions and ethical rules and opinions provide
clients with substantially more protection than they do to the
attorneys. Nevertheless, this is necessary to counter the unequal
bargaining power between the attorney and the client. However, some
of these limitations are ambiguous and likely to discourage use or
encourage misuse of the statute for the following five reasons: (1) the
ethical rules have made asserting an attorney lien too risky; (2) the
retaining lien has been limited to the point where it is useless; (3) the
courts have failed to clarify whether a lien on money in the hands of
the attorney is a retaining lien or a charging lien; (4) the courts have
limited the charging lien on policy grounds when the attorney gains
too much leverage; and (5) attorney liens are useless when the client
settles. In addition, the Washington higher courts have rarely upheld
the validity of an attorney lien.
Therefore, the Washington legislature should amend the
Attorney Lien Statute to correct these problems. With respect to
retaining liens on the client's files, the statute should place the burden
on the client to prove that the files are necessary and the statute should
be invalid for criminal defense and for defending fundamental rights.
The statute should also classify the lien on money in the attorney's
hands as a retaining lien. Additionally, the legislature should
determine which types of property should be protected, in the public
interest, from attorney liens and specifically exclude those types of
property from the statute. Finally, the statute should be amended to
provide for a lien on settlement proceeds. Until these changes are
made, attorneys should only resort to attorney liens when absolutely
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necessary and proper-otherwise, they may face such consequences as
involuntary pro bono.

